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国家税务总局关于中国和意大利政府海运协定税收条款换函生效的通知

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国家税务总局关于中国和意大利政府海运协定税收条款换函生效的通知

国家税务总局


国家税务总局关于中国和意大利政府海运协定税收条款换函生效的通知

国税发[2005]53号




各省、自治区、直辖市和计划单列市国家税务局、地方税务局,扬州税务进修学院:
中国和意大利政府代表于2004年10月21日就两国政府间海运协定中涉及税收的相关条款进行修改予以正式换函。现双方通过外交途径相互通知确认换函于2005年3月28日生效。现将该换函印发给你们,请自文到之日起执行。

国家税务总局

二○○五年四月四日

意驻华大使致张春贤部长的函
中华人民共和国交通部

张春贤部长阁下


亲爱的张春贤部长:
我谨提及一九七二年十月八日在北京签署的《意大利共和国政府与中华人民共和国政府海运协定》,并建议:(一)将该协定第九条第二款修改为:“缔约一方的海运公司从事国际运输业务取得的收入,缔约另一方豁免所得税和其他任何税收”:(二)上述的修改将不影响一九八六年十月三十一日签署的《意大利共和国政府和中华人民共和国政府关于对所得避免双重征税和防止偷漏税协定》的规定。
如中华人民共和国政府同意上述的建议,我建议本函和您的复函将构成两国政府间的一项协议。缔约双方根据各自国内法完成使本换函生效的法律程序后相互通知,本换函自最后一方收到对方通知之日起生效。
顺致最高的敬意。
意大利共和国驻中华人民共和国
特命全权大使孟凯帝(签字)
二○○四年十月二十一日于北京


张春贤部长致意驻华大使的复函
意大利共和国驻中华人民共和国

特命全权大使

孟凯帝阁下


亲爱的孟凯帝大使:
我荣幸地确认收到您今日的来函,其内容如下:
“我谨提及一九七二年十月八日在北京签署的《意大利共和国政府与中华人民共和国政府海运协定》,并建议:(一)将该协定第九条第二款修改为:“缔约一方的海运公司从事国际运输业务取得的收入,缔约另一方豁免所得税和其他任何税收”;(二)上述的修改将不影响一九八六年十月三十一日签署的《意大利共和国政府和中华人民共和国政府关于对所得避免双重征税和防止偷漏税协定》的规定。
如中华人民共和国政府同意上述的建议,我建议本函和您的复函将构成两国政府间的一项协议。缔约双方根据各自国内法完成使本换函生效的法律程序后相互通知,本换函自最后一方收到对方通知之日起生效。
顺致最高的敬意。”
以上建议,中华人民共和国政府是可以接受的。
顺致崇高的敬意。
中华人民共和国交通部
部 长
张春贤

二○○四年十月二十一日


Chapter VI
General Rules of Evidence
under the WTO Jurisprudence


OUTLINE

I Burden of Proof under the WTO Jurisprudence
(ⅰ) General Rules Well Established in Violation Complaints
(ⅱ) Burden of Proof in case of Invoking an Exception
(ⅲ) Special Rules Concerning Non-Violation Claims
(ⅳ) Summary and Conclusions
II Admissibility of Certain Evidences
(ⅰ) Evidence Obtained from Prior Consultations
(a) Procedural Concern: Confidentiality of Consultations
(b) Substantial Concern: Necessity or Relevance of Evidence
(ⅱ) Arguments before Domestic Investigative Authorities
(ⅲ) Arguments Submitted after the First Substantive Meeting
(a) There is a significant difference between the claims and the arguments supporting those claims.
(b)There is no provision establishing precise deadlines for the presentation of evidence.
III Panel’s Right to Seek Information
(ⅰ) A Grant of Discretionary Authority
(ⅱ) The Admissibility of Non-requested Information
(ⅲ) Summary and Conclusions
IV Adverse Inferences from Party’s Refusal to Provide Information Requested
(ⅰ) The Authority of a Panel to Request Information from a Party to the Dispute
(ⅱ) The Duty of a Member to Comply with the Request of a Panel to Provide Information
(ⅲ) The Drawing of Adverse Inferences from the Refusal of a Party to Provide Information Requested by the Panel
V Concluding Remarks

I Burden of Proof under the WTO Jurisprudence
Generally, the question of whether a member acted in accordance with the agreement hinges frequently on whether and to what extent that member must demonstrate compliance or the complaint must demonstrate a lack of compliance. It is demonstrated that the burden of proof is a procedural concept which speaks to the fair and orderly management and disposition of a dispute. This is the issue of “the ultimate burden of proof for establishing a claim or a defence”. In this respect, the Panel Report on US-Copyright Act (DS160) states, “[w]hile a duty rests on all parties to produce evidence and to cooperate in presenting evidence to the Panel, this is an issue that has to be distinguished from the question of who bears the ultimate burden of proof for establishing a claim or a defence”.1
(i) General Rules Well Established in Violation Complaints
Art. 3.8 of the DSU provides that in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement -- that is, in cases where a violation is established -- there is a presumption of nullification or impairment. However, the issue of burden of proof here is not what happens after a violation is established; the issue is which party must first show that there is, or is not, a violation. In this respect, a number of GATT 1947 panel reports contain language supporting the proposition that the burden of establishing a violation under Article XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1947 was on the complaining party, i.e., it was for the complaining party to present a prima facie case of violation before a panel. This rule is taken on by the DSB.
With regard to the issue of burden of proof, the Appellate Body in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33) rules that: “In addressing this issue, we find it difficult, indeed, to see how any system of judicial settlement could work if it incorporated the proposition that the mere assertion of a claim might amount to proof. It is, thus, hardly surprising that various international tribunals, including the International Court of Justice, have generally and consistently accepted and applied the rule that the party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or the respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof. Also, it is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.” 2And this ruling is demonstrated to be well established in subsequent cases as a general rule concerning burden of proof.
For example, in Argentina-Leather (DS155), the Panel states: “The relevant rules concerning burden of proof, while not expressly provided for in the DSU, are well established in WTO jurisprudence. The general rule is set out in the Appellate Body report on United States - Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses, wherein it is stated that: ‘It is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption’.” 3
And in US-Cotton Yarn (DS192), the Panel rules in pertinent part: “The Appellate Body and subsequent panels endorsed this principle that a complainant bears the burden of proof. For example, the Appellate Body, in EC - Hormones, states as follows: ‘… The initial burden lies on the complaining party, which must establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with a particular provision of the SPS Agreement on the part of the defending party, or more precisely, of its SPS measure or measures complained about. When that prima facie case is made, the burden of proof moves to the defending party, which must in turn counter or refute the claimed inconsistency. This seems straightforward enough and is in conformity with our ruling in United States - Shirts and Blouses, which the Panel invokes and which embodies a rule applicable in any adversarial proceedings.’” 4
As a whole, on the one hand, as ruled by the Panel in Argentina-Ceramic Floor Tiles (DS189), “[w]e recall that the burden of proof in WTO dispute settlement proceedings rests with the party that asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. It implies that the complaining party will be required to make a prima facie case of violation of the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, which is for the defendant…to refute. In this regard, the Appellate Body has stated that ‘... a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party presenting the prima facie case’…”; 5 on the other hand, as noted in the Panel Report on US-Copyright Act (DS160), “[t]he same rules apply where the existence of a specific fact is alleged. We note that a party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or the respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof. It is for the party alleging the fact to prove its existence. It is then for the other party to submit evidence to the contrary if it challenges the existence of that fact”. 6
In sum, with respect to the general rules of burden of proof in the context of violation complaints, as ruled by the Panel in Japan-Film (DS44): “[w]e note that as in all cases under the WTO/GATT dispute settlement system - and, indeed, as the Appellate Body recently stated, under most systems of jurisprudence - it is for the party asserting a fact, claim or defence to bear the burden of providing proof thereof. Once that party has put forward sufficient evidence to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden of producing evidence then shifts to the other party to rebut the presumption.…”. 7Certainly, as noted by the Appellate Body in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), “[i]n the context of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement precisely how much and precisely what kind of evidence will be required to establish such a presumption will necessarily vary from measure to measure, provision to provision and case to case”.8
(ii) Burden of Proof in case of Invoking an Exception
As discussed above, generally, the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts a fact or the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. As to be shown, this rule applies equally even in case of invoking an exception.
In this context, it is a general principle of law, well-established by panels in prior GATT/WTO practice, that the party (the defendant) which invokes an exception in order to justify its action carries the burden of proof that it has fulfilled the conditions for invoking the exception. However, in the author’s view, to understand the issue concerning burden of proof in case of invoking an exception, which is different from the relatively clear burden of establishing a prima facie case of violation on the complaining party, it’s helpful to stress some points here, among which the key point is to be cautious while determine which defence is “affirmative” and therefore burdens the defendant to provide sufficient evidence to rebut the challenged violation.
In United States-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), India argues that it was “customary GATT practice” that the party invoking a provision which had been identified as an exception must offer proof that the conditions set out in that provision were met. The Appellate Body acknowledges that several GATT 1947 and WTO panels have required such proof of a party invoking a defence, such as those found in Art. XX or Art. XI:2(c)(i), to a claim of violation of a GATT obligation, such as those found in Arts. I:1, II:1, III or XI:1. Arts. XX and XI:(2)(c)(i) are limited exceptions from obligations under certain other provisions of the GATT 1994, not positive rules establishing obligations in themselves. They are in the nature of affirmative defences. It is only reasonable that the burden of establishing such a defence, i.e. invoking an exception in the nature of affirmative defences, should rest on the party asserting it. 9
However, as ruled by the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48), “[t]he general rule in a dispute settlement proceeding requiring a complaining party to establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with a provision of …[the covered agreements] before the burden of showing consistency with that provision is taken on by the defending party, is not avoided by simply describing that same provision as an ‘exception’. In much the same way, merely characterizing a treaty provision as an ‘exception’ does not by itself justify a ‘stricter’ or ‘narrower’ interpretation of that provision than would be warranted by examination of the ordinary meaning of the actual treaty words, viewed in context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose, or, in other words, by applying the normal rules of treaty interpretation. It is also well to remember that a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party presenting the prima facie case.” 10
In short, during the process of the establishment of a violation, it’s generally up to the complainant to provide evidence concerning inconsistency, and only in case of limited exceptions the burden of proof rests upon the defending party invoking a defence in the nature of affirmative defences, such as those found in Art. XX or Art. XI:2(c)(i) of the GATT 1994.
(iii) Special Rules Concerning Non-Violation Claims
As suggested by the corresponding provisions, the most significant difference between violation complaints under Art. XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1994 and non-violation ones under Art. XXIII:1(b) is, while, when violation complaints are brought under Art. XXIII:1(a), the infringement of an obligation of the agreements is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment, from the fact of violation alone, by establishing a formal presumption, such a presumption does not exist in non-violation cases.
With the lack of such a presumption, and given the nature of the factually complex disputes and particular claims of non-violation nullification or impairment, the resolution of issues relating to the proper allocation of the burden of proof is of particular importance. In case of non-violation nullification or impairment, i.e., where the application of Art. XXIII:1(b) is concerned, Art. 26.1(a) of the DSU and panel practice in the context of the WTO Agreement and GATT jurisprudence confirm that this is an exceptional course of action for which the complaining party bears the burden of providing a detailed justification to back up its allegations.
This requirement has been recognized and applied by a number of GATT panels. For example, the panel on Uruguayan Recourse to Art. XXIII noted that in cases “where there is no infringement of GATT provisions, it would be ... incumbent on the country invoking Article XXIII to demonstrate the grounds and reasons for its invocation. Detailed submissions on the part of that contracting party on these points were therefore essential for a judgement to be made under this Article”. And the panel on US - Agricultural Waiver noted, in applying the 1979 codification of this rule: “The party bringing a complaint under [Article XXIII:1(b)] would normally be expected to explain in detail that benefits accruing to it under a tariff concession have been nullified or impaired”.
Art. 26.1(a) of the DSU codifies the prior GATT practice, which provides in relevant part: “the complaining party shall present a detailed justification in support of any complaint relating to a measure which does not conflict with the relevant covered agreement ...”.

上海市除四害工作管理暂行规定

上海市政府


上海市除四害工作管理暂行规定
上海市政府


第一章 总 则
第一条 为消灭蚊、蝇、鼠、蟑螂(以下简称四害),控制其危害,防止疾病传播,保障人民身体健康,根据有关法律、法规的规定,结合本市实际情况,制定本规定。
第二条 本规定适用于本市市区及县属城镇。
第三条 凡本市范围内的单位和个人,都有防范和杀灭四害的义务。
第四条 除四害工作所需经费,除各级政府对公共无主地区予以补贴外,各单位和住户应予承担。
第五条 市爱国卫生运动委员会(以下简称爱卫会)是执行本规定的主管部门。市爱卫会办公室组织本规定的实施,并会同同级卫生防疫部门负责辖区内除四害工作的日常监督管理。

第二章 控制与处理
第六条 除四害工作由市、区、县、街道(镇)爱卫会统一领导,各基层单位的主管部门应协同抓好所属系统的除四害工作。
第七条 除四害应采取改造环境,控制四害孳生地及杀灭蚊、蝇、鼠、蟑螂等综合防治措施。易招致或孳生四害的行业和场所,在生产、经营、贮存、运输、管理、养护及废弃物处理中,应有完善的防范杀灭措施,并严格控制四害的繁殖。
第八条 各地区、单位、住户应有防鼠灭鼠措施,可采取堵洞、毒杀、粘捕等方法消灭老鼠。中小单位应达到无鼠要求;大型单位应达到以鼠夹法测定,捕鼠不超过二只,或以粉迹法测定,鼠迹不超过五处,或鼠征不超过二处;街道(镇)范围内应达到鼠夹法鼠密度不超过百分之一,
或粉迹法阳性率不超过百分之五,或鼠征阳性率不超过百分之二。
第九条 各地区、单位、住户应积极做好翻缸倒罐、平整洼地等工作,严格控制所管理范围内的蚊虫孳生场所,并运用化学、物理、生物等灭蚊方法,消灭幼虫和成蚊。小单位积水场所不得有蚊虫孳生;中型单位积水场所蚊虫孳生总面积不得超过二平方米;大型单位积水场所蚊虫孳生
总面积不得超过五平方米;市区及近郊街道(镇)范围内积水场所蚊虫孳生有害率分别不得超过百分之五和百分之十。
单位内部不得有成蚊集聚。
第十条 各地区、单位应加强人畜粪便和废弃物的管理,采取诱捕、拍打和喷洒药物等方法消灭苍蝇。凡易招致苍蝇及孳生苍蝇的行业和重点场所,应逐步完善防蝇灭蝇措施。小单位不得有苍蝇孳生;中型单位苍蝇孳生总面积不得超过二平方米;大型单位苍蝇孳生总面积不得超过五平
方米;市区及近郊街道(镇)范围内苍蝇孳生有害率分别不得超过百分之五和百分之十。
单位内部不得有成蝇集聚。
第十一条 各地区、单位、住户应消除蟑螂的栖息场所,运用毒杀、粘捕和喷洒药物等方法杀灭蟑螂。成、若虫阳性率不超过百分之五,平均密度每间不得超过五只;卵蛸阳性率不超过百分之二,平均密度每间不得超过二只。

第三章 监督与管理
第十二条 市和区、县设除害监督员。除害监督员由从事除害卫生专业人员和管理人员担任,分别由市或区、县爱卫会任命。除害监督员行使下列职责:
(一)依据本规定对所管理范围内的除四害工作进行监督管理;
(二)宣传除四害知识,指导除害执勤员开展工作;
(三)处理违反本规定的事件。
第十三条 各街道(县属镇)设除害执勤员。除害执勤员由街道(县属镇)爱卫会任命,并报区、县爱卫会备案。除害执勤员行使下列职责:
(一)在除害监督员的指导下,检查、督促本地区及地区内的单位和住户进行除四害工作;
(二)协助除害监督员处理违反本规定的事件。
第十四条 各单位的上级主管部门,应加强对本系统所属单位除四害工作的管理。食品生产、饮食、水产、废品、粮食、畜牧、环卫、建工、市政、房管、园林等行业的上级主管部门,应指定人员对所属单位执行本规定的情况进行检查、督促。
第十五条 凡无力自行落实除害措施的单位和个体工商户,可委托除害服务机构代为处理,并支付相应的药物和劳务费用。其收费标准由市爱卫会办公室会同市财政局、市物价局统一制定。
第十六条 凡成立地区群众性除害服务机构,应报区、县爱卫会办公室审批;凡属企业性除害服务机构,应报市爱卫会办公室审批,经审核批准和工商行政管理部门登记后才能接受除害业务。除害服务应确保除害质量,凡未达到除害效果的,应按本规定承担责任。

第四章 罚 则
第十七条 凡违反本规定第八、九、十、十一条的,街道(镇)以上的监督管理部门可分别情况,对单位给予警告并限期整改、罚款、直至责令其停业整顿的处罚;对住户可给予警告并限期整改的处罚。
第十八条 对中小型单位未达到本规定第八、九、十条规定的无鼠或无蚊、蝇孳生地要求的,给予警告并限期整改,限期整改时间为三至七天。经警告并限期整改后仍未达到规定要求的,酌情给予二十元以上五百元以下的罚款,直至责令其停业整顿。
第十九条 除本规定第十八条另有规定外,对虫害超过规定标准二倍以上的单位,给予警告并限期整改,限期整改时间为三至七天。经警告并限期整改后,虫害仍超过规定标准的,分别下列情况,处以罚款:
(一)虫害超过规定标准,在二倍以下的,对中型单位处以二十元以上五十元以下的罚款;对大型单位(包括街道和镇,下同)处以五十元以上二百元以下的罚款。
(二)虫害超过规定标准二倍以上四倍以下的,对中型单位处以五十元以上二百元以下的罚款;对大型单位处以二百元以上五百元以下的罚款。
(三)虫害超过规定标准四倍以上六倍以下的,对中型单位处以二百元以上五百元以下的罚款;对大型单位处以五百元以上一千元以下的罚款。
(四)虫害超过规定标准六倍以上的,对中型单位处以五百元以上一千元以下的罚款;对大型单位处以一千元以上二千元以下的罚款。
虫害超过规定标准六倍以上,严重影响产品质量或危害人体健康的,责令其停业整顿。
第二十条 对流动摊贩和从事非固定作业的人员违反本规定,招致四害集聚或造成虫害孳生的,除害监督员可现场给予二十元以下的罚款。
除害监督员现场执法须有两人以上;罚款须出具统一印制的罚款收据单。
第二十一条 凡二十元以上不满五百元的罚款,由街道(县属镇)爱卫会办公室决定,并定期报区、县爱卫会办公室备案;五百元以上的罚款,由区、县爱卫会办公室决定,并定期报市爱卫会办公室备案;责令停业整顿的,由区、县爱卫会办公室报请市爱卫会办公室批准后执行。
第二十二条 单位的罚款不得计入生产、销售成本。罚款所得一律上缴所在区、县爱卫会办公室,其中百分之二十上缴市爱卫会办公室,百分之四十回拨给街道(镇)爱卫会办公室,区、县爱卫会办公室自留百分之四十。
罚款所得限用于开展除害工作,专款专用,并接受同级财政部门监督检查。具体使用和管理办法,由市爱卫会办公室会同市财政局制订。
第二十三条 被处罚单位或个人对处罚决定不服的,可在接到处罚决定书的次日起七天内向上一级爱卫会办公室提出申请复议一次,上一级爱卫会办公室的复议决定为终局决定;上一级爱卫会办公室应在收到复议申请的次日起十天内作出书面决定,并告申请复议的单位或个人。

第五章 附 则
第二十四条 本规定下列用语含义:
(一)鼠夹法是指以一日内布放的有效鼠夹中捕到老鼠的鼠夹所占比例来计算鼠密度的一种测定方法。
(二)粉迹法是指以一日内布放的长、宽各二十厘米的有效粉块中有鼠迹粉块所占比例计算鼠害程度的一种测定方法。
(三)鼠征阳性率是指有鼠洞、鼠粪、鼠咬痕的房间数占总查房间数的比例。
(四)蟑螂成、若虫阳性率或卵蛸阳性率是指发现有成、若虫或卵蛸的房间占总查房间数的百分比;平均密度是指阳性房间成、若虫或卵蛸的平均数。
(五)“孳生地”是指适宜蚊、蝇等虫害繁殖生长的场所。
(六)“易招致或孳生四害的行业和场所”,是指有招致四害或孳生、繁殖四害的适宜条件,经常发现虫害且数量比较密集的行业和地方。如建筑工地,公厕,垃圾堆点,牧场,饲养场,屠宰场,菜场,集贸市场,饮食、水产以及其他食品的生产、加工、经销单位,废品堆存处理场所
,绿化地带,下水道,防空洞,开挖工地等。
(七)小型单位是指单位占地或使用面积不满一千平方米的单位;中型单位是指单位占地或使用面积在一千平方米以上不满三千平方米的单位;大型单位是指单位占地或使用面积在三千平方米以上五千平方米以下的单位;单位占地或使用面积在五千平方米以上一万平方米以下的,作两
个大型单位计算;超过一万平方米的,以此类推。
第二十五条 本规定由市爱卫会负责解释。各县的乡村除四害管理工作,可参照本规定执行。
第二十六条 本规定自一九八八年五月十五日起施行。过去有关规定与本规定相抵触的,以本规定为准。



1988年4月20日